Venture capital plays a critical role in spurring innovation, encouraging entrepreneurship, and generating wealth. As a part of the nancial market, venture capital is a ected by market downturns and economic cycles, but it also creates bubbles that negatively impact the economy and social stability. Although the venture capital market is a potential source of systemic risk, there has been little study of its contagion risk mechanism, or how the failure of a single market participant can threaten systemic stability. We use a multilayer network analysis to model the risk contagion in a venture capital market when an external shock impacts a venture capital rm or start-up company in order to understand how risk can spread through connections between market participants and harm total market robustness. We use our model to describe both the direct and indirect channels in the venture capital market that propagates risk and loss. Using real data from the worldwide venture capital market, we nd that the venture capital market exhibits the same "robust-yet-fragile" feature as other nancial systems. e coupling e ect of direct and indirect risk contagions can cause abrupt transitions and large-scale damage even when the turbulence is minor. We also nd that the network structure, connectivity, and cash position distribution of market participants impact market robustness. Our study complements other emerging research on measuring systemic risk through multiple connections among market players and on the feedback risk contagion between the nancial industry and the real economy.
Introduction
Start-ups positively impact economic growth and development and are essential drivers of aggregate innovation and productivity. Innovative start-ups develop products and services that o en require a high initial investment in research and development [1] . Because new rms generate only limited cash ows, and their initial capital is also o en limited, many start-ups must rely on funds from such external sources as venture capital agencies to survive [2] . Venture capitalists (VCs) invest in small private growth companies that have a cash ow insu cient to pay interest on debt or dividends on equity. Typically VCs invest in private companies for a period of 2-7 years prior to exit and derive their return from the capital gains in the exit transactions [3] . Many studies have found that venture capital investment is a major factor in fostering these start-ups [4] [5] [6] .
At the same time, venture capital is a part of the private equity market and is thus vulnerable to broad market turbulence and economic recessions. e venture capital market is fragile to external shocks. Downturns in the nancial market make it di cult for venture capital rms to raise su cient funds or to exit start-up companies with adequate returns. Because most start-ups have negative earnings and few tangible assets, they are particularly susceptible to failure. e venture capital market also interacts with the stock market. Since 1999, venture capital has backed 60 percent of the IPOs (initial public o ering) o ered in the U.S. stock market [7] . us instability in the venture capital market can induce damage to the overall nancial market and to the entire economic system. e 2008 nancial crisis elicited much research and produced a huge body of literature on the systemic risk mechanism in play when interconnected economic agents are simultaneously a ected by severe losses that then spread throughout the economic system. Systemic risk can produce a nancial domino e ect or failure avalanche in which even small correlated events can cause system breakdown. One of the crucial elements in the rise of so-called cascades of failures are connections between di erent elements of the system [8] [9] [10] . ese connections may transmit negative e ects from one institution to another causing great damage to the whole economy. Risk contagions among di erent economic agents such as banks, insurance companies, hedge funds are investigated, and the structure of nancial networks is regarded as a critical component that can either attenuate or amplify systemic risk [11] .
Because network science describes both the behavior of economic system participants and the relationships among them when modeling contagion mechanisms [12] [13] [14] [15] , researchers are using it to study risk propagation in such economic systems as banking networks, buyer and seller credit systems, international trade, capital markets, and stock markets [16] [17] [18] [19] . In a network-based risk contagion analysis, vertices represent agents in economic systems and links represent interconnections among them. A basic measure that characterizes network topology is the degree distribution ( ), which is the fraction of nodes connected to nodes or neighbors. is function can be used to calculate the rst, ⟨ ⟩, and second, ⟨ 2 ⟩, distribution moments that measure mean degree connectivity and degree heterogeneity, respectively. Two typical network topologies are widely used: (i) Erdös Rényi (ER) networks in which ( ) follows a Poisson distribution, and (ii) scale-free (SF) networks with ( ) ∼ − with min ≤ ≤ max , in which is a measure of heterogeneity, and min and max are the minimum and maximum connectivities, respectively. ere are two commonly used approaches to the modeling of risk contagion mechanism in economic systems. e rst approach is epidemiological and assumes that losses propagate through a market following an epidemic disease pattern. e asset loss or liquidity shortage experienced by a nancial institution or economic agent is treated as an infected state in a classical SIR (Susceptible-Infected-Recovered) model [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] that assumes the infection spreads with a given probability to susceptible or healthy institutions and agents. e second approach uses the overload model in which each node (each economic agent) is assigned an asset state based on its simplied balance sheet. When the asset value of the node is lower than a given critical level, it fails and transmits losses to its neighbor nodes [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] .
In addition to the propagation mechanism, there are risk contagion channels that de ne which interactions and linkages among economic agents can transmit loss or risk. We classify the risk contagion channels in the current literature as either direct or indirect connections. Direct interactions occur when there are concrete economic activities among such economic agents as credit relations between banks who loan to rms and rms who borrow from banks, supply chain contracts between buyers and sellers, credit relationships in the inter-bank market, and equity holding relationships between investors and investees [10, [30] [31] [32] [33] . Indirect interconnections occur when there are interactions among economic agents through direct relations with such common third parties as common assets, suppliers, customers, board members, investors, and industries [34] [35] [36] [37] .
In recent years, an increasing number of researchers have discovered that they cannot su ciently model risk contagion if they only examine single channels, an approach that produces results that are unrealistic in the nancial market and economic system. ey are discovering that a multilayer network is a powerful tool for analyzing how risk spreads via multiple channels. Various studies using multilayer networks to analyze systemic risk in nancial markets have found that the dynamics of risk contagion in multilayer nancial networks di er greatly from those in a single layer network [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] .
Although venture capital is a strong factor in the nancing and fostering of innovative rms and re-allocating capital to more productive economic sectors, little is known about the risk transmission mechanism in the venture capital market. Our goal is thus to develop a framework for modeling this risk propagation mechanism. We want to know how risk spreads through interconnected market agents and endangers total market stability when an external shock impacts a venture capital rm or a start-up company. Most prior research has focused on risk contagion within a nancial market, e.g., the inter-bank market or the stock market, and has ignored feedback e ects between nancial markets and the real-world economy [33, 43, 44] . is approach is inadequate because systemic risk is generated in both nancial markets and in the coupling e ect between nancial markets and the real-world economy. us our study complements the emerging literature on feedback risk contagions between the nancial market and the real economy for the measurement of systemic risk.
We use this model to analyze how risk and loss propagates from a single failed VC or start-up company to the entire venture capital market and to start-up rms. We ask four questions.
(i) What are the factors that cause total market robustness to be harmed when a single VC fails? (ii) How does the coupling e ect of direct equity connections and their indirect counterparts in uence a ect risk contagion? (iii) How does the network connection structure a ect risk propagation and market robustness? (iv) How do the cash positions of market participants a ect market robustness?
Risk Contagion Mechanisms in the Venture Capital Market
Risk can take di erent forms in di erent settings, e.g., corporate risk, nancial risk, technological risk, but we focus on liquidity risk, an essential concern of investors in the venture capital market and of founders of start-up companies. Prior studies claim that venture capital investment su ers from the same signi cant exposure to liquidity risk as public equity and other alternative asset classes [45] . Start-up businesses are o en short of cash, and 29% of all start-ups fail because of that shortage.
3 Complexity VC liquidity risk has two origins. e rst is initial public o ering (IPO) exit risk-being unable to e ectively exitwhich necessitates remaining much longer in the venture or selling the shares at a punishing discount [46, 47] . e second is related to the ability to raise funds. A VC must periodically raise funds-typically every 3 to 5 years-if it is to survive and continue to make new investments [48, 49] . e capital in the VC ecosystem is supplied by limit partners, including such large institutions as investment banks, pension funds, university and hospital endowments, charitable foundations, insurance companies, wealthy families, and corporations.
Economic downturns alter the conditions that underpin the capital supply of VC limit partners. For example, following the 2008 nancial crisis, the capital commitments to U.S. venture funds fell by almost half, from 28.6 billion USD in 2008 to 15.2 billion USD in 2009 [50] . When the capital supply from the limit partner is xed [51] , the failure of one VC can cause losses to its limit partner, which in turn can transmit the decreased capital supply to unrelated VCs who share the same limit partner with the failed VC. Shocks to a liquidity supply curtail the ability of a VC to raise new funds, invest in new start-up companies, and exit successfully from prior investments.
e liquidity risk to a start-up rm increases when its cash is tied up elsewhere or when it has insu cient cash to meet working capital and expansion needs. It also has two origins. e rst is that innovative start-ups o en face unusually high costs of production, marketing, and branding. Just as venture capital rms must periodically raise new funds from limited partners, start-ups must periodically raise new nancing from their VCs. When VCs have a shortage of capital resources it causes liquidity stress to start-ups that face rigorous competition and that must strongly nance research and development, and marketing [51] . e second origin of liquidity risk comes from the start-up ecosystem in which start-ups invest in each other. ese mutual interactions create user-friendly, a ordable, and innovative solutions that strengthen the market, but they also increase the risk of spillover e ects. When one start-up ceases operation, other interdependent start-ups are a ected.
ere are thus two spread mechanisms for risk in the venture capital market-(i) direct risk that spreads through equity connections between VCs and start-ups, and (ii) indirect risk that spreads via counterpart in uence relations within VCs as well as start-ups. e contagion of direct risk via equity connections is behind the feedback damage transmitted between VCs and start-ups. For example, when an external shock hitting a VC increases the stress on its cash ow, it either quickly exits or shrinks its capital supply, which in turn damages the start-ups in its portfolio. Similarly, if a start-up fails, its venture capital investor loses the equity.
On the other hand, indirect risk propagation is the interdependency among venture capital investors and start-ups. VCs can have a co-nancier relationship when two VCs have at least one common capital provider. Another indirect risk contagion channel emerges when there is an operational reliance between di erent start-ups.
Model

Construct the Multilayer Network.
When quantifying the multi-dimension connections among players in the venture capital market, we rst build a multilayer network = , , , , that represents equity connections between VCs and start-ups as well as the counterpart dependency within the venture capital industry and start-ups. Figure 1 shows the two classes of nodes, where is the VC node set, and is the start-up node set. Each node has a weight that indicates its cash position, i.e., the amount of cash that a VC or start-up has on its books at any given time. We denote ( ) the distribution of . e external link set is the equity connections between venture capital investors and start-ups. When venture capital investor invests in start-up company , a link ij connects node and . Here and both are internal link sets, where is the co-funding relationship between venture capital investors, i.e., when two VCs have a common capital providerusually limited partners-they are internally linked. Similarly, is the business reliance between start-ups. e external and internal links are undirected and unweighted. Here in and in are the degree of internal links of VC and start-up nodes, respectively. Note that when in = in = 0 for all nodes, the network is bipartite. Similarly, ex and ex are the degree of external links for VCs and start-ups, respectively.
Risk Contagion Process.
e risk contagion in our model has two channels. One is direct liquidity shocks via externally linked equity connections. In our model, we select an initial 
1: Schematic of a multilayer network to represent the risk contagion channels.
Complexity 4
Initially, an exogenous shock hits a targeted node in either the VC or start-up layer, and the node fails. e risk contagion dynamics then proceeds in discrete time steps , in each of which the failure node transmits liquidity damage to healthy neighbors via external links, and the current cash position of each healthy node is where ℎ ex ( ) is the number of external links between a healthy node and its neighbor that still survive at time . At each time step , we test each healthy node . If its current cash value is < C , the node fails. Take VC node as an example. e possiblity that a VC will fail is in uenced by both the number of failed start-up projects it has invested in and the initial cash value it holds. e greater the number of failed start-up companies a VC holds, the greater the probability it will fail. On the other hand, the higher the cash value it holds, the lower the probability it will fail. For the risk spread via internal links, if the fraction of its failed neighbors connected by internal links is higher than the threshold , it also fails. e simulation stops when there are no more venture capital investors and start-up failures.
Here we quantify market robustness to be the ratio of surviving market participants, including both venture capital investors and start-up companies [52] , where and are the number of surviving VC and start-up nodes at the end of the risk contagion simulation, respectively. Here and are the sizes of VC and start-up node sets, respectively. Note that there are alternative approaches to measure system robustness and nancial market systemic risk. A series of monetary measurements, including total loss level due to default, nancial distress level, and total recovery cost, have also been widely used to quantify systemic risk [10, 30, [53] [54] [55] .
Data
We obtain venture capital investment data from Bureau van Dijk (BVd), a leading global publisher of business information. Zephyr is the most comprehensive BVd database and contains information of over 80% of global venture investments [56]. We use a dataset from 1 January to 31 December 2017 that covers = 7000 venture capital rms, = 7475 portfolio projects, and 21116 investment events. Each investment dataset includes the name of the start-up company, the venture capital rm investing in it, and the starting date of the investment agreement. We use investment data to generate equity connections between venture capital investors and start-up companies represented by external links in the multilayer network. Figure 2 shows the degree distribution of VC nodes and start-up nodes. e degree distribution of VC nodes follows a power law decay. us, within 1 year, most VCs invest in a limited number of start-ups, and only a few invest in many. However, the degree distribution of the start-ups is almost unimodal, indicating that it is di cult for start-ups companies
failure node from the VC or start-up layer. A failed VC node transmits a shock through external links to its portfolio company . is means a failed VC will reduce or withdraw the commitment of the capital supply, which in turn will increase the nancial cost for a start-up company to raise capital to maintain its liquidity. At the same time, when a startup node fails its venture capital investors still hold the start-up equity as an asset, but the equity value decreases and becomes di cult to liquidate due to a lack of buyers. To thus maintain a su cient level of liquidity, the VC either borrows money at a very high interest or re-sales the asset at a signi cant loss. Similarly, a failed start-up node shocks the liquidity of its venture capital investor .
Here the parameter quanti es the level of transmitted damage caused by failed VCs or start-ups through external connection. So nancially represents the extra nancial cost to VCs and start-ups needed to maintain liquidity, and this decreases its cash position. When a node receives damage through an external link, its cash position decreases . We assume every node has an equal cash tolerance threshold C = 0, i.e., for every node when < C , node fails. When < min a node fails when one external link fails because its updated cash position − remains positive, but when > max a node fails when one external neighbor fails because its updated cash position − is now negative.
In addition to liquidity damage spreading via external links, internal links constitute another indirect risk contagion channel in the form of co-funding relationships or business reliances. Venture capital investors get their capital supply from limited partners. Limited partners usually rebalance their portfolios to stabilize their investment return. When the return of the venture capital market is lower than the limited partners expect-due to the failure of venture capital rms in their portfolio-they shrink its capital supply, which in turn causes still surviving venture capital rms in the portfolio to lose liquidity and possibly fail. So the capital supply of a VC is a ected by the state of other VCs who share common limited partners. Meanwhile, small-scale start-up companies must collaborate with other start-ups who serve as suppliers and distributors, and thus their health is strongly tied to the health of their connected business partners.
Here quanti es the two types of counterpart reliance that can spread risk. When the fraction of its failed neighbors exceeds a given threshold in the range [0, 1], it also fails. e lower the value of , the more sensitive are VCs and start-ups to the state of their counterparts. We assume to be identical for all nodes. us a node fails either because its current cash position is lower than tolerance C or the fraction of its internally linked neighbors is lower than .
In our simulations, all VC and start-up nodes are initially assigned a cash position value 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅, , where is the system size, with a distribution ( ). We examine three distribution functions: truncated normal, exponential, and uniform distribution. To conduct a comparison, we set the three distributions at the same mean value = 1/ × ∑ =1 and the low and high boundaries in the range [0, 10]. We denote these distributions , , Exp , and [0, 10].
Complexity
We nd that when only external links provide the channel that propagates the losses, the venture capital market is robust. When ≲ 1 the liquidity shock spreads very little. When the damage level is extremely high, e.g., = 10, approximately 10% players can still survive. When increases, market robustness deteriorates linearly and gradually.
When both external and internal links a ect the risk contagions, the entire market exhibits an abrupt transition. When ≳ 1, the market discontinuously transitions from a stable state in which more than 80% of the market players survive to an unstable state in which more than 90% of the market players fail. is explains why when direct and indirect risk spillover e ects are present, the market becomes fragile such that the failure of a single market player at even a minor damage level can trigger the collapse of the entire market. erefore, venture capital market exhibits the similar "robust-yet-fragile" feature as other nancial systems because when only considering direct risk contagion channels, the market is robust while for direct and indirect contagion channels coupling with each other, the system is fragile. Note in the insets of Figure 3 that for the cases with internal links, the fraction of active nodes decreases abruptly at di erent values of in all realizations. Heuristically, because only one node is removed at the initial condition, the point of collapse of the system is more sensitive to this initial condition since the cash position and the internal structure are random. Because the behaviors are similar, irrespective of whether the initial shock is from the VC or start-up layer, we only examine simulation results when the initial shock hits the VC layer in following parts of our study. In Appendix B, we show the simulation results when shock hits the start-up layer.
To explore how the topology of internal links impacts on market robustness, we generate ER random and scale-free (SF) networks with the same average degree ⟨ in ⟩ = 4 for VC and start-up nodes, respectively. In addition to the topology of internal links, the initial weight distribution ( ) a ects the cash ow of market players when an external shock occurs. us di erent distributions cause di erent levels of risk propagation.
Examining the initial cash distribution, we consider three functions, (i) truncated normal (in the range [0, 10]), (ii) exponential, and (iii) uniform distributions, all with mean value = 5. At the beginning of the simulation, we fail the highest degree VC node, and the risk propagates through both internal and external links.
to launch a large number of nancing activities within one year. e average degrees of the VC and start-up layers are 3 and 2.8, respectively.
Simulation Results
We investigate how risk propagates when a liquidity shock hits a market player, VC investor, or start-up. We select the VC and start-up nodes with the highest number of external links and examine market robustness as a function of transmitting damage , taking into account two risk contagion mechanisms. One only considers external links as channels for risk contagion. e other considers both external and internal links as channels for risk contagion. In setting up the simulation, we designate the initially failed node to be the VC or start-up node with the highest degree of external links. We select the most highly connected node to initially fail because the venture capital market functions like a nature ecosystem in which new companies compete with each other like species following the law of survival of the ttest. us the death of one start-up company or VC is normal and has no serious e ect on system robustness. Market participants in venture capital markets and regulatory authorities are most concerned when the most highly connected companies or companies holding the largest asset fail because they want to understand how markets react when this happens and how it a ects the robustness of the entire system. We currently do not have information about the asset scale of venture capital rms and start-up companies because most are private corporations with no obligation to make their nancial condition public. We thus focus our attention on risk contagion when the most highly connected companies fail, which is similar to a worst-case scenario stress test conducted on the banking system.
In Figures 3(a) and 3(b) , ( ) is an uniform distribution with ranging from [0, 10]. e internal links within the VC and start-up layers both form an ER random network with an average degree ⟨ in ⟩ = 4 and a tolerance = 0.5. We construct the internal networks using the con gurational model [57, 58] . participants have a low cash position, and that a few have a very high cash position. is skewness and imbalance increases market fragility such that even a minor shock to one player can trigger a collapse of the entire market.
To analyze how ⟨ in ⟩ in uences risk propagation, we use an ER network to generate internal links for both VC and start-up nodes with an average degree ⟨ in ⟩ varying from 0 to 20. Figure 5 compares the phase diagram of market robustness with di erent values and the average degree ⟨ in ⟩ when follows (a) uniform, (b) exponential, and (c)-(e) truncated normal distributions. In all cases the value of the mean weight is = 5. Figures 5(c)-5(e) correspond to a truncated distribution with dispersion = 3, = 1, and = 0. Note that = 0 corresponds to a delta distribution. Figure 5 shows that exhibits similar dynamics patterns for uniform, exponential, and truncated normal distributions when = 1 and = 3. When the connectivity of internal links is very small, e.g., when ⟨ in ⟩ < 1, decreases slowly as Figure 4 compares the relationship between market resilience and the level of transmitting damage for ER and SF internal links with di erent distributions ( ). We nd that the market robustness in both ER and SF internal links exhibits an abrupt transition from a phase in which almost all nodes are active to a phase in which an insigni cant number of nodes are active. However, when the internal links are SF, the market collapses at lower damage level, which means that at the same level damage transmission the market is more fragile with SF internal links than with ER. Note that the point at which abruptly transitions depends on the weight distribution ( ).
We use to quantify the level of liquidity shock when more than 50% market players survive the risk propagation. Note that the value of depends on the weight distribution. A truncated normal distribution has a higher value than the uniform and exponential distributions, and the value for the exponential distribution is lowest. e exponential distribution of indicates that the majority of market 3: Market robustness as the function of transmitting shock level considering that the initial failure occurs in the VC layer (a) and in the start-up layer (b). e black curve represents the scenario only considering risk contagion via external links while the red line represents the risk propagation with internal and external link coupling e ect. In each layer we use = 0.5 and internal structure topology corresponds to a random ER network with ⟨ in ⟩ = 4. e weight follows a uniform distribution in [0, 10]. e results were averaged over 100 realizations. In the insets we show 100 individual realizations (gray) and the average curve (red). 7 Complexity ( = = min = max for = 1, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ), the critical value of is the same as because:
(i) when < 5 = min , the failure of an initial node in one layer does not damage neighbors in the other layer-they do not fail because their cash position − is positive (see Section 3.2), and (ii) when > 5 = max , the failure of an initial node can destroy the entire network because all of its nodes are fragile-if even one neighbor fails, they all fail in a domino e ect (see Section 3.2). us, for < , since external links cannot transmit the damage (when the initial shock does not transmit the damage through internal links), the internal structure does not a ect increases, because the risk contagion e ect of internal links is limited and is similar to risk spreading through external links. When connectivity is increased, the market crashes when reaches a certain level, e.g., when ⟨ in ⟩ = 2, exhibits an abrupt transition as increases. In addition, for higher values of ⟨ in ⟩, market robustness still experiences an abrupt transition, but the critical value that causes market to transition from a stable to an unstable state becomes higher. us when the average degree of the internal links is higher than 2, the internal links become increasingly dense, and the market can tolerate a higher level of transmitted damage.
On the other hand, for a delta distribution, i.e., when all the nodes have the same weight, the point of the abrupt transition is independent of the value of ⟨ in ⟩, and its position is at = = 5. When the weight is homogeneous k in F 5: Phase diagram of the market robustness in the plane -⟨ in ⟩ for = 0.5 and di erent weight distributions: uniform (a), exponential (b), truncated normal with dispersion = 3 (c), = 1 (d), and = 0 (e). Yellow corresponds to = 1 and black to = 0. For all weight distributions, the mean weight is = 5. e internal degree distribution corresponds to an ER network with ⟨ in ⟩ = 4. e initial shock is in the VC layer. e results were averaged over 100 realizations. (i) direct propagation via equity connections between VCs and start-ups, and (ii) coupling contagions of both direct and indirect spread. We also investigate the impact of various parameters, including damage transmission level, network structure, connectivity, and the impact of the cash position distribution of market participants on market robustness.
We nd that when losses propagate only via direct dependencies between VCs and start-ups, there is little damage to the venture capital market, and the system remains robust to minor turbulence. When there are both direct and indirect risk contagion channels, e.g., co-nancier relationship among VCs and mutual business dependency within start-ups, the whole market becomes fragile and there is an abrupt transition from the stable to an unstable state. We also nd that an SF network of internal links collapses at a lower transmitting damage level than an ER random network. e simulation results also show that increasing the connectivity increases the value of . is behavior is in contrast to the nonhomogeneous weight in which the propagation of the failure through external links is boosted by the internal links, and hence depends on ⟨ in ⟩.
Comparing the robustness of di erent weight distributions, Figure 6 shows a plot of as a function of ⟨ in ⟩. We nd that for all distributions of (except the delta distribution), decreases sharply when ⟨ in ⟩ varies in the range 0-2. A er ⟨ in ⟩ surpasses 2, tends to rise and causes more highly connected internal links within the VCs and the start-ups to absorb risk and increase market robustness. Note however that when the network connectivity exceeds a critical value, the risk dispersion e ect caused by incrementing connectivity will be decremented. Figure 6 shows that increases very slightly or remains stable for large values of ⟨ in ⟩. On the other hand, for the delta distribution, we nd that is independent of ⟨ in ⟩ as shown in Figure 5 and the value of is the highest compared to the other distributions. In addition, we observe for the other distributions that the higher the probability that a node has a low weight, the lower the value of . us when many players or nodes have a similar cash position, the market is more robust, and the weight heterogeneity increases market susceptibility to failure cascades.
Summary and Conclusions
We have proposed a network-based risk contagion model to investigate whether the failure of one market player can negatively a ect system stability. In our model, a multi-layer network is established to describe the multiple risk contagion channels in venture capital market, in which we use external links to represent the direct equity connections between venture capital industry and start-up businesses as well as internal links to represent the indirect counterpart relations within VCs and start-ups.
Using real data from worldwide venture capital markets, we simulate shocks to a venture capital rm. We evaluate how the venture capital industry and start-up business react, and how the losses are transmitted from a single element to the whole system taking into consideration two contagion mechanisms: 8: as the function of average degree of internal links ⟨ in ⟩ when the initial shock is in the start-up layer, for di erent weight distributions: uniform (black), exponential (red), truncated normal with = 0 (magenta), = 1 (green), and = 3 (blue). current approach solely considering single risk contagion channels systematically underestimate expected systemic losses. When the direct and indirect risk contagion couple together, even a mild level liquidity shortage and bankruptcy of one rm could trigger the catastrophic collapse of the venture market. is will harm the fundamentals of industrial innovation. For policy regulators, only focusing on the direct shock transmission could lead to serious bias. Currently, it lacks detailed information about the co-fund raising interconnection among venture capital rms and business reliance of start-up companies. In the future, if the government could collect and publish these data, it will be helpful to propose metrics combining direct and indirect connections to e ectively measure the stability of the venture capital market.
In Figures 7 and 8 , we show the fraction of active nodes as a function of and the value of as a function of ⟨ in ⟩when the initial shock market robustness, but that when market connectivity reaches a certain value, the risk-absorbing e ect becomes limited. e distribution of players' cash positions also a ects the risk contagion. When the player cash positions are more homogeneous, the damage tolerance is higher, but when they are more heterogeneous-with many nodes experiencing a low cash position-the market collapses at a lower damage level.
us heterogeneity in either the internal degree distribution or the cash position distribution increases system fragility.
Our ndings increase the understanding of nancial system robustness when participants interact through multiple connections. Our results indicate that only taking into consideration direct risk spillovers, the venture capital market exhibits robust stability. However, when indirect and direct risk contagion mechanisms couple together, it can be very fragile and very sensitive to a small initial failure. is paper indicates that venture capital rm as a nancial intermedia has its positive role to foster innovation by providing capital. While it also has downside e ects to transmit turbulence from the nancial market to the start-up economy. We show the For the SF network, the minimum connectivity is min = 2, the maximum connectivity max is the size of each layer and = 2.65. e initial shock is on the venture capital market. e results were averaged over 100 realizations. F 10: as the function of average degree of internal links ⟨ in ⟩ for = 0.30 (a) and = 0.70 (b) and for di erent weight distributions: uniform (black), exponential (red), truncated normal with = 0 (magenta), = 1 (green) and = 3 (blue). e internal degree distribution corresponds to an ER network. e initial shock is on the venture capital market. ER and SF networks. We obtain that these gures are qualitatively similar to Figure 4 . However, for = 0.7, the market robustness for ER is similar to the case of SF which is expected because the failure probability due to the risk spread via internal links decreases as increases, and hence the e ect of internal topology becomes less relevant for the risk propagation. as a function of ⟨ in ⟩ for = 0.30 (a) and = 0.70 (b) . We observe that the results shown in these gures are similar to those in Figure 6 .
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